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Federal Removal Jurisdiction*
IRA S. FLORY, JR. t
PART II
GROUNDS OF REMOVAL
FEDERAL QUESTION
The first statute to permit removal of causes arising under
United States Constitution, statutes, or treaties, when a sufficient
amount was involved, was that of 1875. Under this act it was
enough if the record at the time of removal showed that either
party claimed a right under the federal Constitution or laws; it
was not necessary that the federal question appear in the plain-
tiff's petition.' The party seeking removal had to state enough
facts to show that he claimed a substantial right under federal
authority,2 and if that authority formed a necessary ingredient of
the case, as part of either the aserted claim or defense, removal
eould be had.8
Under the Act of 1887-88, however, there was the require-
ment that a federal court must have been able to hear the case
originally in order to obtain a removal; and a federal question
must appear in the plaintiff's statement of his own case before
there can be original federal jurisdiction. In Tennessee v. Union
& Planters' Bank,' the plaintiff's claim was based entirely on a
Tennessee statute, and the right under the federal Constitution
was raised as a matter of defense. This, said the Court, conferred
no jurisdiction by removal under the new statute, as the federal
question must appear as a substantial ingredient of the plaintiff's
*This is the second and concluding installment of the present article,
the first having appeared in (1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 499. This article
was largely prepared during the author's year as Sterling Fellow at Yale
University Law School.
t Member of the Shreveport Bar.
1. Smith v. Greenhow, 109 U.S. 669, 3 S.Ct. 421, 27 L. Ed. 1080 (1884);
Southern Pac. R. Co. v. California, 118 U.S. 109, 6 S.Ct. 993, 30 L.Ed. 103 (1F86).
See also Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135, 26 L.Ed. 96 (1880); Ames v.
Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 4 S.Ct. 437, 28 L.Ed. 482 (1884); Brown v. Houston, 114
U.S. 622, 5 S.Ct. 1091, 29 L.Ed. 257 (1885).
2. Gibbs v. Crandall, 120 U.S. 105, 7 S.Ct. 497, 30 LEd. 590 (1887).
3. New York v. Independent Steam-Boat Co., 22 Fed. 801 (C.C.S.D. N.Y.
1885), affirmed 115 U.S. 248, 6 S.Ct. 28, 29 L.Ed. 388 (1885).
4. 152 U.S. 454, 14 S.Ct. 654, 38 L.Ed. 511 (1894).
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claim before the defendant can remove, as a result of the "poten-
tiality of originality" provision of section 2 of the 1887-88 Act.
This interpretation has since been followed.5 Not only must the
federal issue appear in the plaintiff's complaint, but it must prop-
erly be there, and the anticipation of a defense based on federal
statute or Constitution does not confer the right of removal.6
There are, however, exceptions to this general rule, such as where
the plaintiff failed to state what court appointed the defendant
receiver; this did not prevent the federal receiver from removing;'
nor did a similar concealment of a federal marshal's status by the
plaintiff prevent removal;8 and a removal of cases arising in res-
ervations and sites within the jurisdiction of a federal court is not
dependent upon the plaintiff's petition mentioning the federal
question.9
What Constitutes a Federal Question?
To have a federal question, it is necessary that some title,
right, privilege, or immunity be dependent on the manner in
which a federal statute or provision of the Constitution is applied.
This requirement is satisfied by the attack on water rates on the
ground that they were made without authority of law; 10 but is not
satisfied by a city's suit to halt the operation of an unauthorized
ferry." It is not enough that a federal statute may incidentally
5. In re Winn, 213 U.S. 458, 29 S.Ct. 515, 53 L.Ed. 873 (1909); Williams v.
First Nat. Bank of Pauls Valley, 216 U.S. 582, 30 S.Ct. 441, 54 L.Ed. 625 (1910);
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 38 S.Ct. 237, 62 L.Ed. 713
(1918). See also Chappell v. Waterworth, 155 U.S. 102, 15 S.Ct. 34, 39 L.Ed. 85
(1894); Oregon Short Line & U. N. Ry. Co. v. Skottowe, 162 U.S. 490, 16 S.Ct.
869, 40 L.Ed. 1048 (1896); Walker v. Collins, 167 U.S. 57, 17 S.Ct. 738, 42 L.Ed.
76 (1897); Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U.S. 48, 24 S.Ct. 598, 48
L.Ed. 870 (1904); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 29
S.Ct. 42, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908); Blease v. Safety Transit Co., 50 F. (2d) 852
(C.C.A. 4th, 1931); Philipbar v. Derby, 11 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. N.Y. 1935);
Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Adams, 81 Miss. 90, 32 So. 937 (1902); State v. Colum-
bia Ry., Gas & Electric Co., 112 S.C. 528, 100 S.E. 355 (1919).
6. Kansas v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 77 Fed. 339 (C.C. Kan. 1896);
Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Adams, 81 Miss. 90, 32 So. 937 (1902).
7. Winters v. Drake, 102 Fed. 545 (C.C. N.D. Ohio 1900).
8. Wood v. Drake, 70 Fed. 881 (C.C. Wash. 1895).
9. Steele v. Halligan, 229 Fed. 1011 (W.D. Wash. 1916), pointing out that
there is federal jurisdiction here unless special grounds for state authority
are asserted In the plaintiff's petition.
10. City Commission v. Bismarck Water Supply Co., 47 N.D. 179, 181
N.W.. 596 (1921).
11. Starin v. New York, 115 U.S. 248, 6 S.Ct. 28, 29 L.Ed. 388 (1885). While
removal can be had only when the action will succeed on one construction of
the federal Constitution or statute, and fail on the contrary interpretation,
there is the difference as to appeals that review of the Supreme Court can be
obtained for denial of a right secured by any federal authority or commission.
See also Carson v. Dunham, 121 U.S. 421, 7 S.Ct. 1030, 30 L.Ed. 992 (1887); this
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be construed at some time in the case, but substantial reliance
must be made upon it so as to have the decision depend on such
construction. 1 2 The fact of other issues being likewise involved
does not prevent removal of a case possessing a substantial federal
question.18 The decision must depend on the question of law of
how the federal act will be interpreted. Thus removal is denied
when only a question of mixed law and fact, or fact only, is pre-
sented, such as the proper service of a nonresident insurance
company, 4 or the boundaries of a mining claim,' 5 neither involv-
ing the construction of a federal statute.
The fact that a federal statute put Arkansas law in force tem-
porarily in Indian Territory did not permit removal of a suit
under that law, construction of the federal statute not being ma-
terial to a settlement of the case.' There was no federal question
in an action to enjoin the sale of liquor as a nuisance,'7 nor in an
action for damages caused by threats to sue under patent laws for
infringement of patent rights in a pump. 8 In a suit where the
plaintiff asserted an adverse mining claim, the court would not
take judicial notice of the fact that a federal statute governing
adverse claims controlled the case, so as to permit removal. 9
On the other hand, citizenship of the parties is immaterial
when a federal question and the jurisdictional amount are pre-
decision refused removal because only an ordinary property right was in-
volved in plaintiff's statement of his case and not a direct dealing with the
federal Constitution, statute or treaty, and further suggested that a denial
by the state courts of a title, right, privilege or immunity arising under fed-
eral authority other than Constitution or statute can be reviewed by the
Supreme Court on appeal from the highest state court, under Judicial Code,
§ 237 (a), 28 U.S.C.A. § 344, par. 1 (1926). Appeal to the Supreme Court could
be obtained if any subsequently-arising right under federal Constitution or
statute is later denied by the state courts, as stated in Central R. Co. of New
Jersey v. Mills, 113 U.S. 249, 5 S.Ct. 456, 28 L.Ed. 949 (1885), where removal on
the ground of a federal question was denied when a contract of lease was
attacked by plaintiff's petition for reasons other than conflict with United
States Constitution or law.
12. Little York Gold Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 24 L.Ed.
656 (1878).
13. Southern Pac. R. Co. v. California, 118 U.S. 109, 6 S.Ct. 993, 30 L.Ed.
103 (1886).
14. Germania Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 119 U.S. 473, 7 S.Ct. 260, 30 L.Ed. 461
(1886).
15. Blue Bird Min. Co. v. Largey, 49 Fed. 289 (C.C. Mont. 1892).
16. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Hollan, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 55,
107 S. W. 642 (1908).
17. Lemon v. Wagner, 68 Iowa 660, 27 N.W. 814 (1886).
18. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 36
S.Ct. 585, 60 L.Ed. 987 (1916).
19. Mountain View M. & M. Co. v. McFadden, 180 U.S. 533, 21 S.Ct. 488,
45 L.Ed. 656 (1901).
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sented,20 and the suit of a state-nonremovable for diversity of
citizenship-can be removed if a substantial federal question is
raised in the plaintiff's complaint.21 Whenever an act of Congress
is necessarily involved in deciding on the plaintiff's claim, whether
mentioned in it or not, there is a sufficient federal question, and
among the situations which meet this requirement are the fol-
lowing: an ejectment action which depends upon the validity of
a patent of land bringing in acts of Congress so as to make a fed-
eral question; 22 a controversy which involves authority of the land
department to grant a patent, raising as it does the acts of Con-
gress on the subject; 28 a case where an act of Congress must be
construed to determine whether a grant by the state was for an
unlimited time or for twenty-one years, this being a federal ques-
tion presented by plaintiff's case;2 4 an action where plaintiff's
claim to a right to build a dock in the Calumet River without in-
terference by the city of Chicago was based on federal Consti-
tution and laws and on a permit from the Secretary of War; 25 a
controversy as to whether the Hepburn Act of Congress forbade a
carrier from giving a free pass to an employee of the Railway
Mail Service unless on duty; 26 an ejectment action where the
plaintiff's rights depended upon the interpretation of an act of
Congress of 1901 governing descent of lands held by the Creek
tribe of Indians; 27 and a civil action in the nature of a quo war-
ranto proceeding to test a corporation's right to do business, charg-
ing a conspiracy to monopolize state and interstate telephone
business in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, though the
federal statute was not named.
2 8
There is a federal question in a controversy over the powers
of a federal receiver, whether acting under express statute or
order of the court appointing him, 29 and the same is true of a suit
20. Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U.S. 410, 23 S.Ct. 472, 47 L.Ed. 525 (1903).
21. Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 4 S.Ct. 437, 28 L.Ed. 482 (1884).
22. Doolan v. Carr, 125 U.S. 618, 8 S.Ct. 1228, 31 L.Ed. 844 (1887).
23. Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U.S. 406, 11 S.Ct. 819, 35 L.Ed. 442 (1891).
24. Coosaw Min. Co. v. South Carolina, 144 U.S. 550, 12 S.Ct. 689, 36 L.Ed.
537 (1892).
25. Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U.S. 410, 23 S.Ct. 472, 47 L.Ed. 525 (1903).
26. Schuyler v. Southern Pac. Co., 37 Utah 581, 109 Pac. 458 (1909), af-
firmed 227 U.S. 601, 33 S.Ct. 277, 57 L.Ed. 662, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 901 (1913).
27. Shellenbarger v. Fewell, 236 U.S. 68, 35 S.Ct. 234, 59 L.Ed. 470 (1915).
28. Dougherty v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 235 Mich. 416, 209 N.W. 200
(1926).
29. State v. Frost, 113 Wis. 623, 88 N.W. 912, 89 N.W. 915 (1902).
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against a United States marshal.30 Before an act of Congress of
1925 declared that incorporation under federal law did not raise
a federal question, this was an acceptable ground for removal;'
but where there was no separable controversy as to the resident
codefendant joined with the corporation created under federal
act, the latter could not remove the action on the ground of a fed-
eral question.3 2 It has been held that a dispute over the validity
of a lien claimed under a judgment rendered by a federal circuit
court raised an issue determinable under the laws of the United
States and rules of its courts, so as to be a federal question and
removable,3 3 whereas merely suing on a judgment rendered by a
federal court does not create a federal question when no term of
the national Constitution or of a federal statute was involved. 4
There is a difference of opinion among the lower federal
courts as to the effect of a previous decision of the Supreme Court
concerning the statute which would otherwise create a federal
question. One view maintains that there is no longer a removable
question of law, but only a fitting of the facts of the case to the
act as construed;33 while the other contention is that the previous
decision on a different state of facts does not destroy the federal
question otherwise presented, and the right of removal is re-
tained.3 6 Each case depends on the cause of action presented by
the plaintiff's pleading, but it is safe to say that removal cannot
be had of an action under a state statute or constitutional provi-
sion, which defendant seeks to block by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, or some other term of the federal
Constitution or federal law.3
30. Feibelman v. Packard, 109 U.S. 421, 3 S.Ct. 289, 27 L.Ed. 984 (1883),
holding that suit against a United States marshal on his official bond for
seizure of property in excess of the jurisdictional amount, under order from a
federal court, is a civil action arising under acts of Congress governing his
duties and removable to the federal court, where he can justify his acts by
showing the property belonged to the bankrupt. Accord: Bock v. Perkins,
139 U.S. 628, 11 S.Ct. 677, 35 L.Ed. 314 (1891); McKee v. Brooks, 64 Tex. 255
(1885).
31. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Barrett, 166 U.S. 617, 17 S.Ct. 707, 41 L.Ed. 1136
(1897). The statute referred to is 43 Stat. 941 (1925), 28 U.S.C.A. § 42 (1926).
32. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Huber, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 75, 75 S.W. 547 (1903).
33. Cooke v. Avery, 147 U.S. 375, 13 S.Ct. 340, 37 L.Ed. 209 (1893).
34. Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S. 586, 9 S.Ct. 173, 32 L.Ed. 543 (1888).
35. Kansas v. Bradley, 26 Fed. 289 (C.C. Kan. 1885); Myrtle v. Nevada,
C. & 0. Ry. Co., 137 Fed. 193 (C.C. Nev. 1905); Orr v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co.,
83 Misc. Rep. 221, 145 N.Y. Supp. 378 (1913).
36. Mallon v. Hyde, 76 Fed. 388 (C.C. Wash. 1896); Alabama Great So. Ry.
Co. v. American Cotton Oil Co., 229 Fed. 11 (C.C.A. 5th, 1916); Nelms, Kehoe
& Nelms v. Davis, 277 Fed. 982 (S.D. Tex. 1921).
37. Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Texas, 170 U.S. 226,
18 S.Ct. 603, 42 L.Ed. 1017 (1898); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U.S.
482, 15 S.Ct. 192, 39 L.Ed. 231 (1894).
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Prohibition against Removing Cases under Federal Employers'
Liability Act or Merchant Marine Act
Prior to the amendment of 1910 making this prohibition, a
case under the Federal Employers' Liability Act could be removed
for involving a federal question, though concurrent jurisdiction
was given to state courts. 8 As carried into the Judicial Code,3 "a
this provision is:
"No case arising under sections 51 to 59 of Title 45 [Em-
ployers' Liability Act], and brought in any State court of com-
petent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United
States."
This was held to forbid removal of any case after the act, even
though the cause of action arose before its enactment.39 When at-
tacked as unconstitutional for discriminating against one class of
litigants, and denying equal protection of the laws in preventing
them from removing when others of the same class could do so, it
was declared a legitimate exercise of legislative authority over
the subject of removal by Congress, whose power to set an arbi-
trary amount for removal jurisdiction had never been denied. "In
our view Congress has entire control over the subject, and may
give the right in some instances where it regards it as proper, and
not give it in other instances where it does not choose to do So.''41
The purpose of the amendment is, of course, to allow one suing
for compensation under the act to keep his case in the state court
by choosing that tribunal, and to make any federal review be by
appeal, writ of certiorari, or certificate from the highest state
court directly to the Supreme Court. This has been called a per-
sonal privilege of the plaintiff, which he might waive,41 but the
better view appears to be that it is a withdrawal by Congress of
removal jurisdiction over a certain class of cases that would other-
38. Miller v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 168 Fed. 982 (C.C. N.D. Ga. 1909); Nelson
v. Southern Ry. Co., 172 Fed. 478 (C.C. N.D. Ga. 1909).
38a. 36 Stat. 1094 (1911), as amended by 38 Stat. 278 (1914), 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 71, sentence 8 (1926).
39. Hulac v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 194 Fed. 747 (D.C. Neb. 1912); Teel
v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 204 Fed. 918, 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 21 (C.C.A. 6th,
1913).
40. McChesney v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 197 Fed. 85, 88 (W.D. Ky. 1912).
Accord: Kelly's Adm'x v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 201 Fed. 602 (E.D. Ky.
1912); Gibson v. Bellingham & N. Ry. Co., 213 Fed. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1914).
41. Stephens v. Chicago, M. & P. S. Ry. Co., 206 Fed. 854 (D.C. Idaho
1913).
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wise be removable, and no case within this withdrawn class can
be removed.42
The Merchant Marine Act provides:
. . . and in such action all statutes of the United States
modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in
cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and
in case of the death of any seaman as a result of any such per-
sonal injury the personal representative of such seaman may
maintain an action for damages at law with the right of trial
by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States
conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the
case of railway employees shall be applicable. 
4s2a
Whether this includes a prohibition against removal has been dis-
puted among the lower federal courts. The first view in the Wash-
ington district was that the prohibition did not apply, and re-
moval was granted, 43 but a later case extended the provisior
denying removal to cases for personal injuries under the Merchant
Marine Act.4 In New York, it was first held that the prohibition
did not apply to any action under the Merchant Marine Act.
45
Later it was held that the prohibition against removal was effec-
tive as to an action for death, but not for personal injuries,46 but
this distinction was soon dropped and removal is prevented in
both cases.'
7
DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP
Original federal jurisdiction for cases exhibiting diversity of
state citizenship and a sufficient sum is provided for in section 24
42. Lee v. Toledo, St. L. & W. Ry. Co., 193 Fed. 685 (E.D. Ill. 1912);
Patton v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., 208 Fed. 29 (E.D. Tenn. 1913).
42a. Merchant Marine Act, § 20, 38 Stat. 1185 (1915), as amended by 41
Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 (1926).
43. Wenzler v. Robin Line S. S. Co., 277 Fed. 812 (W. D. Wash 1921).
44. Cook v. Alaska S. S. Co., 8 F. (2d) 207 (W. D. Wash 1925).
45. Malia v. Southern Pac. Co., 293 Fed. 902 (E.D. N.Y. 1923).
46. Beer v. Clyde S. S. Co., 300 Fed. 561 (S.D. N.Y. 1923); Reyes v. United
States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 299 Fed. 957 (E.D. N.Y. 1924).
47. Martin v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 1 F.
(2d) 603 (S.D. N.Y. 1924). Regarding actions for death, the different language
in the Merchant Marine (or Jones) Act was declared to be based on the fact
that no action for wrongful death existed at common law until Lord Camp-
bell's Act, while an action did exist for personal injuries. The distinction was
declared unimportant, and the action for personal injuries remanded to the
state court, as coming within the prohibition. Accord: Atianza v. United
States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 3 F. (2d) 845 (E.D. N.Y. 1924),
overruling Malla v. Southern Pac. Co., 293 Fed. 902 (E.D. N.Y. 1923) cited
in note 45, supra.
19391
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of the Judicial Code,48 and the second sentence of the removal sec-
tion provides that
"Any other suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, of
which the district courts of the United States are given juris-
diction, in any State court, may be removed into the district
court of the United States for the proper district by the defend-
ant or defendants therein, being nonresidents of that State."49
Under this provision, originating in the Act of 1887-88, removal
jurisdiction is limited to cases where suit could have been brought
originally in a federal court, making requirements for diverse
citizenship the same for removal as for original suit,5" except that
under Lee v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co.,51 the venue provisions of
the Judicial Code (§ 51) are not now applied to removals. Like
original suit in the federal courts based on diversity of citizenship,
removal on this ground is for the purpose of providing a court
presumed to be more impartial than the courts of the state in
which either party lives.52
Diversity of citizenship, unlike a federal question, need not
necessarily be shown in the plaintiff's petition, but may be estab-
lished by any part of the record at the time of the petition of
removal.5 The defendant is not estopped from making in his re-
moval petition a correction of a wrong statement in earlier plead-
ings of his own citizenship 54 or of that of the plaintiff.5  The
essential fact of diverse state citizenship must appear somewhere
48. 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (1926).
49. Judicial Code, § 28, 28 U.S.C.A. § 71 (1926).
50. Mexican Nat. R. Co. v. Davidson, 157 U.S. 201, 15 S.Ct. 563, 39 L.Ed.
672 (1895).
51. 260 U.S. 653, 43 S.Ct. 230, 67 L.Ed. 443 (1923), discussed in Part I at
pp. 517 et seq., supra.
52. Anaconda Copper Min. Co. v. Butte-Balaklava Copper Co., 200 Fed.
808 (D.C. Mont. 1912).
53. City of Ysleta v. Canda, 67 Fed. 6 (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1895); St. Louis &
S. F. R. Co. v. Kitchen, 98 Ark. 507, 136 S.W. 970, 50 L.R.A. (N.S.) 828 (1911);
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 107 Ark. 512, 156 S.W. 166 (1913).
54. Reynolds v. Adden, 186 U.S. 348, 10 S.Ct. 843, 34 L.Ed. 360 (1890), in
which the fact that defendant had signed a bond describing himself as a
citizen of Massachusetts did not estop him from asserting his citizenship in
New Hampshire on suit in Louisiana, no one being prejudiced thereby. See
also Carson v. Hyatt, 118 U.S. 279, 6 S.Ct. 1050, 30 L.Ed. 167 (1886), where the
plaintiff's petition declared the removing codefendant to be a citizen of Mas-
sachusetts, the latter was not estopped by her counsel's statement in the
answer that she was a citizen of New York, and she could remove for diver-
sity of citizenship, as it appeared in the plaintiff's petition.
55. Ohle v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 64 Iowa 599, 21 N.W. 101 (1884),
where an affidavit by an officer of the defendant corporation that plaintiff
was a citizen of Illinois, as was the defendant, did not estop the latter from
subsequently asserting that the plaintiff was a citizen of Iowa, and thereby
attempting to remove for diversity of citizenship.
FEDERAL REMOVAL JURISDICTION
on the record that goes to the federal court, however, and if it
does not, the Supreme Court of its own motion takes notice that
federal jurisdiction does not clearly appear on the record.56 In
this showing of federal jurisdiction, the diversity of citizenship
must exist both at the time the suit was started and when the
petition for removal was filed.57 When an action was not origi-
nally removable because of the joinder as defendant of a citizen
of the same state as that of the plaintiff, his later moving to an-
other state did not make it removable. 58
In order to obtain removal on the sole ground of diverse citi-
zenship, the defendant must show that all the parties on one side
of the controversy are citizens of different states from all mem-
bers of the other side; under the prevailing interpretation of
"between citizens of different states" the diversity must be com-
plete." A demurrer can be used to raise an objection to federal
jurisdiction for lack of complete diversity of citizenship as shown
in the plaintiff's complaint. 60 However, where the nonresident's
removal petition was filed before the plaintiff amended his peti-
tion by adding as codefendant a domestic corporation leasing to
the nonresident defendant, the amendment came too late to pre-
vent removal.61
Only Real Parties are Considered
Removal cannot be blocked by the joinder of a resident de-
fendant who is substantially a stranger to the controversy, and
such a formal party is disregarded in determining the real defend-
56. Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 9 S.Ct. 426, 32 L.Ed. 800 (1889).
Supreme Court of its own motion took notice that a Joint stock company
was not an artificial person capable of being regarded as a citizen of a state,
as is a corporation.
57. Gibson v. Bruce, 108 U.S. 561, 2 S.Ct. 873, 27 L.Ed. 825 (1883); Houston
& T. C. Ry. Co. v. Shirley, 111 U.S. 358, 4 S.Ct. 472, 28 L.Ed. 455 (1884); Young
v. Parker's Adm'r, 132 U.S. 267, 10 S.Ct. 75, 33 L.Ed. 352 (1889); Kellam v.
Keith, 144 U.S. 568, 12 S.Ct. 922, 36 L.Ed. 544 (1892). See also Phoenix Ins.
Co. v. Pechner, 95 U.S. 183, 24 L.Ed. 427 (1877); Akers v. Akers, 117 U.S. 197,
6 S.Ct. 669, 29 L.Ed. 883 (1886); Stevens v. Nichols, 130 U.S. 230, 9 S.Ct. 518,
32 L.Ed. 914 (1889).
58. Dart v. Walker, 43 How. Prac. 29 (N.Y. 1871).
59. Gage v. Carraher, 154 U.S. 656, 14 S.Ct. 1190, 25 L.Ed. 989 (1880); Blake
v. McKim, 103 U.S. 336, 26 L.Ed. 563 (1881); Hyde v. Ruble, 104 U.S. 407, 26
L.Ed. 823 (1882); Shainwald v. Lewis, 108 U.S. 158, 2 S.Ct. 385, 27 L.Ed. 691
(1883); Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Insurance Co. of North
America, 151 U.S. 868, 14 S.Ct. 367, 38 L.Ed. 195 (1894); Hanrick v. Hanrick,
153 U.S. 192, 14 S.Ct. 835, 38 L.Ed. 685 (1894); Mogg v. Farley, 205 Ky. 25, 265
S.W. 449 (1924); Jackson County Bank v. Hester, 188 N.C. 68, 123 S.E. 308
(1924).
60. Coal Company v. Blatchford, 78 U.S. 172, 20 L.Ed. 179 (1871).
61. Davis' Adm'r v, Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 116 Ky. 144, 75 S.W. 275
(1903).
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ant's right to go into the federal court.6 2 Where the removal peti-
tion of a nonresident corporation pointed out that the codefend-
ant resident directors were not necessary to the suit, they were
eliminated so as to permit removal. 3 In an action by the owner
of property against the junior encumbrancer, joinder of the senior
encumbrancer was found unnecessary because of a separable con-
troversy against him, and on this arrangement of the parties, the
single defendant could remove for diversity of citizenship be-
tween himself and the plaintiff." On the other hand, a savings
institution holding the bonds for which suit was brought was held
to be a necessary party defendant, and since it was a citizen of the
same state as plaintiff, the other defendants could not remove for
diverse citizenship between plaintiff and themselves, not having
a separable controversy.65 Yet on similar facts the depositary of
a fund was found not to be a necessary party to a suit between
two citizens of different states claiming the sum deposited; the
joinder of the trustee-depositary as defendant did not prevent
removal based on diversity of citizenship. 66
A trustee is generally considered a necessary party. Where he
held property in trust to secure payment of notes by the code-
fendant, he was a necessary party whose residence in the same
state as plaintiff defeated removal for diversity of citizenship."
The same was true of a trustee under a mortgage with the power
to sell the property on default of payment.6 8 Also, where a trustee
of such a fund has been joined, the beneficiary under a trust
deed, although he need not be joined, was treated as a necessary
party so as to prevent removal when his citizenship was the same
as plaintiff's. 6 9 In the foreclosure of a mortgage, the resident mort-
gagor corporation and its receiver were necessary parties, pre-
62. Wood v. Davis, 59 U.S. 467, 15 L.Ed. 460 (1856); Bacon v. Rives, 106
U.S. 99, 1 S.Ct. 3, 27 L.Ed. 69 (1882); Hutton v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co.,
8 Del. Ch. 55, 67 Atl. 972 (1896); Swann v. Myers, 79 N.C. 87 (1878).
63. Geer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 428, 23 S.Ct. 807, 47 L.Ed.
1122 (1903).
64. Fritzlen v. Boatmen's Bank, 212 U.S. 364, 29 S.Ct. 366, 53 L.Ed. 551
(1909), affirming 75 Kan. 479, 89 Pac. 915 (1907).
65. Wilson v. Oswego Township, 151 U.S. 56, 14 S.Ct. 259, 38 L.Ed. 70
(1894).
66. Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 264 U.S. 182, 44 S.Ct.
266, 68 L.Ed. 628, 31 A.L.R. 867 (1924).
67. Peper v. Fordyce, 119 U.S. 469, 7 S.Ct. 287, 30 L.Ed. 435 (1886); Massa-
chusetts & So. Constr. Co. v. Cane Creek, 155 U.S. 283, 15 S.Ct. 91, 39 L.Ed.
152 (1894).
68. Gardner v. Brown, 88 U.S. 36, 22 L.Ed. 527 (1875). Accord: Rand v.
Walker, 117 U.S. 340, 6 S.Ct. 769, 29 L.Ed. 907 (1886).
69. Springer v. Sheets, 115 N.C. 370, 20 S.E. 469 (1894).
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venting removal by the nonresident surety.70 There is a difference
of opinion concerning the joinder of an officer who has levied ex-
ecution, one view looking upon him as a merely formal party not
important enough to prevent removal by a codefendant,"1 and the
other considering him necessary and an obstacle to such a move.7 2
In suits joining as codefendants a resident railroad corporation as
lessor together with its lessee, a foreign corporation, the domestic
lessor was held necessary for the doing of full justice, thus pre-
venting the lessee from securing removal.73
Sometimes the court may find it necessary to rearrange the
parties according to their real interest before deciding which par-
ties are necessary, and its right to do so is well recognized.7 ' If
complete diversity is found to exist under this rearrangement, the
defendant can then remove,7 5 and if not, he cannot.70 In a tax-
payer's suit to enjoin officers from levying a tax to pay certain
bonds, the only real defendant, after the parties were rearranged
according to their interests, was the nonresident citizen of another
state who owned all the bonds, and he was allowed to remove to a
federal court.7 In a suit by one of two lessors against the lessee
to obtain an accounting under the lease, the second lessor must be
made a party plaintiff according to her real interest, and as a nec-
essary if not indispensable party her citizenship in the same state
as defendant deprives the federal court of jurisdiction."
Joinder by Plaintiff Controls, unless Fraudulent
When the plaintiff's petition states a prima facie case of joint
cause of action against codefendants, the nonresident wishing to
remove can do so only by showing that the resident was fraudu-
lently joined. The chief indication of such fraudulent intent on
70. United States Mortg. Co. v. McClure, 42 Ore. 190, 70 Pac. 543 (1902),
writ of error dismissed 197 U.S. 624, 25 S.Ct. 798, 49 L.Ed. 911 (1905).
71. Wortsman v. Wade, 77 Ga. 651, 4 Am. St. Rep. 102 (1886).
72. Thorn Wire Hedge Co. v. Fuller, 122 U.S. 535, 7 S.Ct. 1265, 30 L.Ed.
1235 (1887). Accord: Nye v. Nightingale, 6 R. I. 439 (1860).
73. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Crane, 113 U.S. 424, 5 S.Ct. 578, 28 L.Ed.
1064 (1885). Accord: Fleming v. Louisiana & M. R. R. Co., 263 Mo. 180, 172
S.W. 355 (1914); Hill v. Director General of Railroads, 178 N.C. 607, 101 S.E.
378 (1919). But see Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Newman, 128 Ga. 283, 57 S. E.
515 (1907), where not only was no Joint cause of action against the resident
corporation shown so as to make it a necessary defendant, but none at all
was stated, and the nonresident could remove without hindrance.
74. Evers v. Watson, 156 U.S. 527, 15 S.Ct. 430, 39 L.Ed. 520 (1895).
75. Removal Cases, 100 U.S. 457, 25 L.Ed. 593 (1879).
76. Brown v. Trousdale, 138 U.S. 389, 11 S.Ct. 308, 34 L.Ed. 987 (1891).
77. Harter Township v. Kernochan, 103 U.S. 562, 26 L.Ed. 411 (1881).
78. Lee v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 267 U.S. 542, 45 S.Ct. 385, 69 L.Ed. 782
(1925).
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the part of plaintiff is that there was no cause of action against
the resident defendant; the mere epithet of fraud is not enough.79
The filing of separate answers does not make a joint action sep-
arable.8 0 Thus when the plaintiff saw fit to sue several railroads
jointly for the value of cotton lost in transit somewhere on their
lines, the filing of separate answers did not create separable con-
troversies so as to allow those of diverse citizenship from plaintiff
to remove, since in the absence of fraud the plaintiff can elect to
hold all jointly."1 State law is consulted to see whether a cause
of action exists against the resident joined as codefendant, with
some color of fact for leading plaintiff to believe him jointly
liable. If these are found, the resident cannot be disregarded so
far as to allow the nonresident to remove, regardless of the ac-
tion's outcome, and although the plaintiff could have sued each
defendant separately. 2 When the joinder was made in good faith
at the commencement of the action, only the plaintiff's voluntary
dismissal of the resident can allow the nonresident to remove;
this is not made possible when the resident defendant is elimi-
nated by a directed verdict for him,8 a nonsuit as to him,84 or a
dismissal of the case against him at the instance of the nonresi-
dent.8 5 It does not matter that the resident is penniless, and any
judgment secured will probably be enforced against the nonresi-
dent alone.8 6
79. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146, 34 S.Ct. 278, 58
L.Ed. 544 (1914). Accord: Peninsular Iron Co. v. Stone, 121 U.S. 631, 7 S.Ct.
1010, 30 L.Ed. 1020 (1887); Standard Oil Co. v. Turner, 33 Ga. App. 726, 127
S.E. 785 (1925); Wabash R. Co. v. Keeler, 127 Ill. App. 265 (1906); Patton v.
Champion Fibre Co., 192 N.C. 48, 133 S.E. 174 (1926).
80. Pirie v. Tvedt, 115 U.S. 41, 5 S.Ct. 1034, 29 L.Ed. 331 (1885); Sloane v.
Anderson, 117 U.S. 275, 6 S.Ct. 730, 29 L.Ed. 899 (1886).
81. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Ide, 114 U.S. 52, 5 S.Ct. 735, 29 L.Ed. 63 (1885).
82. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Sheegog, 215 U.S. 308, 30 S.Ct. 101, 54 L.Ed.
208 (1909); Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Whiteaker, 239 U.S. 421, 36 S.Ct. 152,
60 L.Ed. 360 (1915). See also Alabama Great So. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 200
U.S. 206, 26 S.Ct. 161, 50 L.Ed. 441, 4 Ann. Cas. 1147 (1906); Chicago, B. & Q.
Ry. Co. v. Willard, 220 U.S. 413, 31 S.Ct. 460, 55 L.Ed. 521 (1911); McAllister v.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 802, 37 S.Ct. 274, 61 L.Ed. 735 (1917); John-
son v. St. Joseph Terminal Ry. Co., 203 Mo. 381, 101 S.W. 641 (1907); White v.
Southern Ry. Co., 146 N.C. 340, 59 S.E. 1042 (1907); Pruitt v. Charlotte Power
Co., 165 N.C. 416, 81 S.E. 624 (1914); Crisp v. Montvale Lumber Co., 189 N.C.
733, 128 S.E. 146 (1925); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Vincent, 116 Tenn. 317, 95
S.W. 179, 8 Ann. Cas. 66 (1906).
83. Landers v. Tracy, 171 Ky. 657, 188 S.W. 763 (1916).
84. Sumey v. Craig Mountain Lumber Co., 31 Idaho 234, 170 Pac. 112
(1918), cert. denied 246 U.S. 667, 38 S.Ct. 336, 62 L.Ed. 929 (1918).
85. Flygen v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 115 Minn. 197, 132 N.W. 10
(1911).
86. Stotler v. Chicago & A. Ry. Co., 200 Mo. 107, 98 S.W. 509 (1906); Able
v. Southern Ry., 73 S.C. 173, 52 S.E. 962 (1906).
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If, on the other hand, the removal petition should contain a
sufficient allegation of facts to indicate the fraudulent joinder of a
resident to prevent removal, in that the plaintiff had no reason-
able ground for believing he could hold him jointly with the non-
resident, the state court should allow removal and leave the federal
court to try the issues of fact on plaintiff's motion to remand."
Thus where the nonresident corporation's removal petition alleged
that its resident employee joined as codefendant had nothing to
do with the injury, that establishes a prima facie case of fraudu-
lent joinder, and the state court should allow removal as a mat-
ter of law for diverse citizenship, with the issues of fact raised by
the removal petition to be settled in the federal court when plain-
tiff moves to remand.8 Usually, the plaintiff's fraudulent intent
is pointed out in the removal petition as being a failure to state
a cause of action under state law against the resident codefend-
ant.89 For example, no cause of action existed against the resi-
dent train engineer (joined with the nonresident railroad com-
pany) for hitting a car only hard enough to move it, causing de-
fective car fastenings to fly off and injure plaintiff, and his joinder
was for this reason fraudulent and ineffective to prevent removal
for diverse citizenship.90 It is not enough to secure removal that
the removal petition merely traverse the facts of plaintiff's allega-
tions, or make a denial on the merits of the case. In one case,
remand to the state court was granted because no facts constitut-
ing fraudulent joinder of the resident corporation were alleged or
proved; 1 and the allegation that the corporation was not in exist-
ence at the time the cause of action arose went to the merits.92
87. Johnson v. Blackwood Lumber Co., 189 N.C. 81, 126 S.E. 165 (1925).
Accord: Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 42 S.Ct. 35, 66 L.Ed.
144 (1921); Little Sandy Cooperage Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 185 Ky.
161, 214 S.W. 912 (1919); Lisanby v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 209 Ky. 325, 272 S.W.
753 (1925).
88. Western Coal & min. Co. v. Osborne, 30 Okla. 235, 119 Pac. 973 (1911).
89. Wecker v. National Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 27 S.Ct.
184, 51 L.Ed. 430, 9 Ann. Cas. 757 (1907). Where no cause of action was stated
against the resident codefendant who had no relation to plaintiff's injury,
his joinder was fraudulent; and the statement in the removal petition of facts
indicating this fraud justified the state court in allowing removal, leaving
the federal court to try the issues of fact in connection with the fraud. See
also Stratton's Independence v. Sterrett, 51 Colo. 17, 117 Pac. 351 (1911); Cin-
cinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Robertson, 115 Ky. 858, 74 S.W. 1061 (1903);
Cox v. Whitmer-Parsons Pulp & Lumber Co., 193 N.C. 28, 136 S. E. 254 (1927).
90. Byrne's Adm'r v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 151 Ky. 553, 152 S.W. 538
(1913).
91. Southern Ry. Co. v. Lloyd, 239 U.S. 496, 36 S.Ct. 210, 60 L.Ed. 402
(1916).
92. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Wangelin, 132 U.S. 599, 10 S.Ct. 203, 33 L.Ed.
474 (1890).
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ACTIONS BETWEEN THE CITIZEN OF A STATE AND FOREIGN STATES,
CITIZENS OR SUBJECTS
The Removal Act of 1789 authorized the removal of a suit
with an alien as defendant 3 This was changed by the Act of 1875
and later acts to make the case removable when suit was between
a citizen of a state and a nonresident alien, and now the mere fact
that an alien is defendant does not necessarily entitle him to re-
moval.94 The present authority for removing suits involving aliens
is the provision of original federal jurisdiction for removing con-
troversies between "citizens of a state and foreign states, citizens,
or subjects,"95 and the provision of sentence 2 of the section on
removal that any other suit of a civil nature in law or equity (be-
sides federal question) of which federal courts are given original
jurisdiction can be removed by a nonresident defendant.8 This
includes actions involving aliens; and a suit by an alien against a
citizen of a state other than where the case is pending can be re-
moved by the defendant.9 7 This specific provision for an alien
citizen or nation rules out any broad interpretation that would
include a suit by a citizen of another country within the category
of suits "between citizens of different states," as this latter pro-
vision applies only to citizens of different states of the United
States.98
Before 1923, when the Lee v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. case
eliminated the venue rule as an obstacle to removal, the better
view on this question would have been to point out that as the
alien plaintiff had no home district in this country, and the citizen
of a state cannot remove from the district in which resident, the
defendant could remove only with the consent of the plaintiff, if
the requirement that suit be in the home district of one party was
adhered to. But the view adopted by the courts was that the alien,
in bringing suit in the state court, had no right to object to re-
moval in that district, and the defendant waived improper venue
by the act of removing.9 9 An action against an alien could like-
93. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Gorbach, 70 Pa. 150 (1871).
94. O'Conor v. Texas, 202 U.S. 501, 26 S.Ct. 726, 50 L.Ed. 1120 (1906),
holding that an alien defendant could no longer remove under U.S. Rev. Stat.
§ 639 (1) after its repeal by 18 Stat. 470 (1875), 24 Stat. 556 (1887) and 25 Stat.
448 (1888).
95. Judicial Code., § 24, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (Supp. 1988).
96. Judicial Code, § 28, 28 U.S.C.A. § 71 (1926).
97. Harold v. Iron Silver Min. Co., 38 Fed. 529 (C.C. Colo. 1888).
98. Compania Minera y Compradora de Metales Mexicano, S. A. v. Amer-
ican Metal Co., 262 Fed. 183 (W.D. Tex. 1920).
99. H. J. Decker, Jr., & Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 189 Fed. 224 (C.C. N.D.
Ala. 1911); Matarazzo v. Hustis, 256 Fed. 882 (N.D. N. Y. 1919).
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wise be removed in the district where suit was pending in the
state court,100 though there is some difference as to whether the
requirement that defendant be a nonresident of the state before
removing from its courts would apply. The view favoring removal
calls residence synonymous with state citizenship, which an alien
could not possess; 1' but it appears more logical to deny removal
when one of the alien defendants actually resides in the state., 2
In addition to alienage and proper venue, the jurisdictional
amount of more than $3,000 must be involved. Thus an action to
enforce specifically an agreement to arbitrate raised only a matter
of convenience, and did not involve a sufficient sum for removal
jurisdiction. 08 An alien corporation is sufficiently a "foreign citi-
zen" to remove on this ground when sued by a citizen of a state,'
and the mere doing of business through a branch office in a state
does not prevent its removing as an alien. 05 Since a state is not
a citizen of a state, its suit against an alien cannot be removed
under the present law, which has done away with the rule of the
1789 Act, allowing an alien defendant to remove, regardless of
the plaintiff who sued him.10 In determining who is an alien
within the removal act, a member of an Indian tribe living in
the United States is not such an alien, and since he is not a citizen
of a state he can remove only if a federal question necessarily ap-
pears in the plaintiff's complaint. 07 After a case has been re-
moved because of having an alien as a party, his naturalization
does not disturb the federal jurisdiction already attached.0 8
Suit by a Citizen against an Alien and a Citizen
It is agreed by all that removal cannot be had of a suit by
citizens and aliens against citizens and aliens, 0 9 or by alien against
100. Niccum v. Northern Assur. Co., 17 F. (2d) 160 (D.C. Ind. 1927).
101. Best v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 243 Fed. 789 (D.C. Mont. 1917).
102. Cudahy v. McGeoch, 37 Fed. 1 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1888); Walker v.
O'Neill, 88 Fed. 374 (C.C. Ky. 1889).
103. In re Red Cross Line, 277 Fed. 853 (S.D. N. Y. 1921).
104. Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & Plate Glass Ins.
Co., 202 Fed. 293 (D.C. Mass. 1913). As stated in National Steamship Co. v.
Tugman, 106 U.S. 118, 1 S.Ct. 58, 27 L.Ed. 87 (1882), the reasoning is simply
that the individual members are conclusively presumed to be citizens of the
foreign country where the corporation is created, making it in effect a legal
citizen of the nation.
105. Baumgarten v. Alliance Assur. Co., 153 Fed. 301 (C.C. N.D. Cal. 1907).
106. O'Conor v. Texas, 202 U.S. 501, 26 S.Ct. 726, 50 L.Ed. 1120 (1906).
107. Paul v. Chilsoquie, 70 Fed. 401 (C.C. Ind. 1895).
108. Haracovic v. Standard Oil Co., 105 Fed. 785 (C.C. N.D. Ill. 1900).
109. Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Insurance Co. of North
America, 151 U.S. 368, 14 S.Ct. 367, 38 L.Ed. 195 (1894).
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alien, 110 or by alien against alien and citizen,"" because having an
alien on each side always bars both original and removal jurisdic-
tion. The statute does allow removal of suits between citizens of
different states, and between a citizen of a state and an alien, but
not specifically for an action between a citizen of one state on one
hand, and a citizen of another state and an alien on the other.
Construing the statute strictly, this should be denied, as has been
announced in cases where the codefendant of the alien was a
citizen of the same state as the plaintiff, which would in any case
have prevented removal.1 2 On the other hand, certain lower fed-
eral courts have pointed out that if the citizen of a state had sued
the alien and the citizen separately, each could undoubtedly have
removed, and the spirit of the act would be better reached by
allowing the joint defendants to remove when each could have
done so." 8
Presence of Alien Prevents Removal on the Grounds of "Sep-
arable Controversy" or for "Prejudice or Local Influence"
Removal of a separable controversy is mentioned in the Re-
moval Act of 1887-88 only in connection with cases of diverse
state citizenship, and consequently it cannot be had where an
alien is a party." 4 Likewise, the original Prejudice or Local In-
fluence Act of 1867 was designed for the special purpose of allow-
ing resort by a citizen of another state to the impartial federal
courts when the antagonism aroused by the Civil War would be
likely to interfere with justice in the state court, and no thought
was given to the plight of an alien subjected to such local prej-
udice. As aliens were not mentioned in connection with this
ground, their presence prevents removal for prejudice or local
influence.1 5
110. Johnson v. Accident Ins. Co., 35 Fed. 374 (C.C. W.D. Mich. 1888).
111. Compania Minera y Compradora de Metales Mexicano, S. A. v.
American Metal Co., 262 Fed. 183 (W.D. Tex. 1920).
112. King v. Cornell, 106 U.S. 395, 1 S.Ct. 312, 27 L.Ed. 60 (1882); Tracy v.
Morel, 88 Fed. 801 (C.C. Neb. 1898).
113. Ballin v. Lehr, 24 Fed. 193 (C.C. S.D. N. Y. 1885); Roberts v. Pacific
& A. Ry. & Nav. Co., 104 Fed. 577 (C.C. Wash. 1900); Baker v. Pinkham, 211
Fed. 728 (E.D. S.C. 1914).
114. Creagh v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 88 Fed. 1 (C.C. Wash. 1898);
Compania Minera y Compradora de Metales Mexicano, S. A. v. American
Metal Co., 262 Fed. 183 (W.D. Tex. 1920). See also Woodrum v. Clay, 33 Fed.
897 (C.C. Kan. 1888); Laden v. Meck, 130 Fed. 877 (C.C.A. 6th, 1904). For
an important qualification of this rule, see Lucania Societa Italiana Di Navi-
gazione v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 15 F. (2d)
568 (S.D. N. Y. 1923).
115. Burlington, Cedar Rapids & N. Ry. Co. v. Dunn, 122 U.S. 513, 7 S.Ct.
1262, 30 L.Ed. 1159 (1887); Crane v. Reeder, 28 Mich. 527, 15 Am. Rep. 223
(1874).
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SUIT BETWEEN CITIZENS OF THE SAME STATE UNDER LAND GRANTS
OF DIFFERENT STATES
The Judicial Code (§ 30) provides that in an action in a state
court involving land titles, wherein the parties are citizens of the
same state and the sum in controversy clearly is over $3,000, one
of the parties may set out his claim under a land grant of one
state (producing the original grant unless it is lost) and demand
that the adversary either answer whether he claims under a grant
of another state or else refrain from giving evidence of the grant
at the trial. If a claim is made under such a grant of a second
state, the party moving for this information can present his peti-
tion for the removal of the cause into the next federal district
court to be held in the district, and the removing party cannot set
up any other title than he has presented.
This ground of removal, now unimportant, was intended to
prevent one state's courts from having to decide whether its own
land grant or that of another state gave good title, with the lurk-
ing possibilities of conflict between states. On this reasoning,
the fact that the states were under the same sovereignty at the
time of the grant did not prevent removal, as the evil to be
avoided was the necessity for one state to pass on the titles of
what was another state at the time of trial.""' However, the party
claiming under a grant of the state in whose court the case was
pending could not remove, when the other party claimed under
a grant of another state; 1 17 and when one state made its grant
solely as agent of the other and not as a sovereignty, the require-
ments for removal were not satisfied."
8
The removal statute gives original jurisdiction over cases
involving land grants of different states only when the parties
are citizens of the same state. 119 Therefore, a controversy between
citizens of different states over land grants by different states
can be tried in a federal court only on the ground of diversity of
citizenship.
DENIAL OF EQUAL CIVIL RIGHTS TO A DEFENDANT IN STATE COURTS
The next section of the Judicial Code 2 0 provides that if in any
civil or criminal case in the state courts the defendant should be
116. Pawlet v. Clark, 13 U.S. 292, 3 L.Ed. 735 (1815).
117. Shepherd's Heirs v. Young, 17 Ky. 203 (1824).
118. Thompson v. Kendrick's Lessee, 6 Tenn. 113 (1818).
119. Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U.S. 165, 25 S.Ct. 6, 49 L.Ed. 142 (1904).
120. Judicial Code, § 31, 28 U.S.C.A. § 74 (1926).
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unable to secure the equal civil rights of a citizen of the United
States or of a person under its jurisdiction, he can file in the state
court a petition of removal at any time before the trial or final
hearing. Upon the filing of this petition stating the facts and veri-
fied by oath, all further proceedings in the state court should
cease, though bail already given in the state court retains its effect.
It is then the duty of the clerk of the state court to furnish the re-
moving party with a copy of all proceedings in the case, which
are filed in the district court on the first day of its session. If the
clerk fails to furnish these copies, the removing party may docket
the case in the district court, which will order the plaintiff to
make new pleadings there or take a nonsuit. If there is no such
refusal by the clerk, the defendant's failure to file a copy of
these pleadings in the district court will lead it to issue a certifi-
cate stating this failure, and this will authorize the state court to
proceed with the case.
This section (§ 31) was declared constitutional, under the
power of Congress to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 121 Removal is a matter of right, but under this sec-
tion the state court must have the chance to inspect the petition
to see if facts justifying removal are stated; and the federal court
has the right to assert its jurisdiction by process to the state court
if it finds the case subject to removal. 1 22 After removal has been
ordered, the state court does not immediately lose all control over
the case, but after the federal court has quashed the original in-
dictment, the state court must then determine whether a new in-
dictment will be presented, or the prosecution dropped.123 How-
ever, until notified of the federal court's action in the case, the
state court can proceed no further.12 When the federal court sees
fit to remand the case, the state court must proceed in the case as
if it had never been improperly removed, 12 5 and no review can be
made under this section of such order of remand.. 2
What Constitutes a Denial of Civil Rights?
The section is meant to insure to any defendant residing in
the United States his full civil rights and the equal protection of
121 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1880); Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 25 L.Ed. 676 (1880).
122. Ex parte Wells, 29 Fed. Cas. No. 17,386 (C.C. La. 1878).
123. Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110, 1 S.Ct. 625, 27 L.Ed. 354 (1883).
124. State v. Dunlap, 65 N.C. 441, 6 Am. Rep. 746 (1871).
125. Ex parte State, 71 Ala. 363 (1882); Stommel v. Timbrel, 84 Iowa 336,
51 N.W. 159 (1892).
126. Cole v. Garland, 107 Fed. 759 (C.C.A. 7th, 1901), writ of error dis-
missed 183 U.S. 693, 22 S.Ct. 933, 46 L.Ed. 393 (1901).
[Vol. I
FEDERAL REMOVAL JURISDICTION
the laws guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of this country,
and is for the benefit of all persons coming under its terms.'2 7 To
justify removal, the denial must be by state statute or constitu-
tion, and a judicial or executive denial can be corrected only by
appeal.128 The discrimination must not be simply the wrongful
act of a state officer, but must originate in the laws of the state.'2 9
After the highest state court has recognized that its state consti-
tution was changed by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, so as to allow negroes to vote and serve on juries,
the refusal of jury commissioners to allow a negro to be a juror
was the wrongful act of the officers, and not a denial of equal civil
rights by state law.130
There must be a real case of deniil of such rights before re-
moval is granted, and when the state laws do not interfere with
the enforcement of rights, the possibility that the state courts may
not enforce the rights secured under these laws does not justify
removal.'"' Thus the remedy was not granted to a marshal and
his sureties sued for trespass,'32 nor to a candidate for a state
office, whose petition claimed that illegal voting for his opponent
should cause him to be declared the rightful incumbent in office;' 2
nor in a suit by a state in its own court against a citizen of an-
other state; nor upon an allegation that defendant's attorney is
a witness in the case, and is wilfully prevented from testifying;'35
nor where the failure of a defendant to secure a trial was due to
her inability to secure an attorney, and to plaintiff's obtaining a
postponement over her protest, and not to any provision of the
state laws;136 nor in a situation where a state statute declared a
building erected as a saloon to be a nuisance, when defendant
claimed it was good for no other purpose;1'3 nor because citizens
of other states can sell liquor in the original package in the state,
127. Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1, 26 S.Ct. 387, 50 L.Ed. 633, 5 Ann. Cas.
692 (1906).
128. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 25 L.Ed. 667 (1880).
129. Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U.S. 101, 16 S.Ct. 990, 41 L.Ed. 87 (1896);
Cooper v. State, 64 Md. 40, 20 Atl. 986 (1885); Fitzgerald v. Allman, 82 N.C.
426 (1880).
130. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 26 L.Ed. 567 (1881). Accord: Bush v.
Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110, 1 S.Ct. 625, 27 L.Ed. 354 (1883).
131. Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896).
132. McKee v. Rains, 77 U.S. 22, 19 L.Ed. 860 (1870).
133. Dubuclet v. Louisiana, 103 U.S. 550, 26 L.Ed. 504 (1881).
134. Alabama v. Wolffe, 18 Fed. 836 (C.C.M.D. Ala. 1883).
135. Chappell v. Real-Estate Pooling Co., 89 Md. 258, 42 Atl. 936 (1899).
136. Scott v. R. D. Kinney & Co., 137 Fed. 1009 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1905).
137. Schmidt v. Cobb, 119 U.S. 286, 7 S.Ct. 1373, 30 L.Ed. 321 (1886).
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when its citizens cannot.188 In a prosecution of a Chinese for pos-
sessing a lottery ticket, under an ordinance applying equally to
anyone, and fair on its face, it was held that a maladministration
of a fair law does not constitute the type of denial of rights dealt
with in this section.18
9
When Petitioning Defendant is in Custody
Provision is made (§ 32) for an occasion where the defend-
ant petitioning for removal is in actual custody under process
from the state court. There the clerk of the district court is to
issue a writ of habeas corpus cum causa, and the marshal is to take
custody of the prisoner under it until he can be dealt with in the
federal court in accordance with law. The marshal leaves a copy
of this writ with the clerk of the state court. The writ is not
needed to effect the removal but is used only to take charge of the
person of a defendant and to notify the state court not to pro-
ceed further with the case.140 The procedure in this section is
followed when the state court refuses to recognize the defend-
ant's right to remove the case, while the preceding section (§ 30)
points out the less drastic remedy of docketing the case in the fed-
eral court when the clerk of the state court simply refuses to fur-
nish copies of the pleadings to file in the district court."'
SUITS AND PROSECUTIONS AGAINST FEDERAL OFFICERS
Whenever a suit or prosecution is instigated against a federal
revenue officer, or one acting under his authority, an officer of a
federal court, or an officer of either house of Congress, for an act
done under color of carrying out the duties of his office, such an
officer may petition for removal to the federal district court held
in the district where the suit is pending, at any time before trial
or final hearing. The petition should set forth the nature of the
case against the defendant, and be verified by affidavit of a lawyer
of the state where suit has been started. The case is then entered
on the docket of the district court and continues as if commenced
there, with bail or other security exacted by the state court con-
tinuing in effect. The clerk of the district court should obtain from
the state court a copy of all pleadings already made, and inform
the state court to stay all further proceedings in the case. The
marshal should take control of a defendant already in custody by
138. Stommel v. Timbrel, 84 Iowa 336, 51 N.W. 159 (1892).
139. California v. Chue Fan, 42 Fed. 865 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1890).
140. Abranches v. Schell, 1 Fed. Cas. No. 21 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1859).
141. Ex parte Wells, 29 Fed. Cas. No. 17,386 (C.C. La. 1878).
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serving a writ of habeas corpus cum causa on the state court. If
no copy of the record and proceedings in the state court can be
secured, the plaintiff can be forced to either make new pleadings
or take a nonsuit.1"
This provision of the Judicial Code (§ 33) came about as the
result of an attempt by one of the states to make it a criminal
offense for the United States officers to collect the internal rev-
enue within that state. The statute was enacted to keep the states
from hampering necessary federal activities,'43 and it has been de-
clared constitutional.1 44 To maintain this independence of fed-
eral officers the statute must be construed rather liberally; 145 al-
though under the present tendency of restricting federal jurisdic-
tion, any construction must be within the terms and intention of
the statute.146
By the right of removing to a federal court, a federal revenue
officer is protected alike in civil and criminal cases from the con-
sequences of his acts done under federal authority. If removal is
made under this section the state court is completely divested of
jurisdiction over the case and cannot proceed against the sureties
on the bail bond for its breach.
4 7
This is not the only remedy of the federal officer. If he can
clearly show on an application for writ of habeas corpus that he
committed no crime in carrying out his official duties, he is en-
titled to a su mmary discharge.4 8
As for the determination of who comes within the terms of
the section, all officers having some rational duties under a "rev-
enue law," whether customs or internal revenue, are included.
49
Revenue laws include acts providing ways of assessment and col-
lection of funds to support the government, such as a post office
142. Judicial Code, § 33, 28 U.S.C.A. § 76 (1926).
143. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 25 L.Ed. 648 (1880).
144. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 25 L.Ed. 648 (1880); Davis v. South
Carolina, 107 U.S. 597, 2 S.Ct. 636, 27 L.Ed. 574 (1883). As this privilege of
removal was extended to the other two classes, Congress possessed the power
to provide removal of cases against officers of federal courts for acts done in
the course of their duties. Matarazzo v. Hustis, 256 Fed. 882 (N.D. N.Y. 1919).
145. State v. Sullivan, 50 Fed. 593 (C.C.W.D. N.C. 1892); Ward v. Congress
Constr. Co., 99 Fed. 598 (C.C.A. 7th, 1900).
146. Johnson v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 98 Fed. 3 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1899); Vir-
ginia v. DeHart, 119 Fed. 626 (C.C.W.D. Va. 1902); Application of Shumpka,
268 Fed. 686 (N.D. N.Y. 1920).
147. Davis v. South Carolina, 107 U.S. 597, 2 S.Ct. 636, 27 L.Ed. 574 (1883).
148. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 658, 34 L.Ed. 55 (1890).
149. People's U. S. Bank v. Goodwin, 162 Fed. 937 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1908).
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law,' and an act imposing a direct tax on the states; 51 but a
reclamation act' 52 and a naval appropriation act"58 are not cov-
ered. The term "revenue law" in the removal sense does not in-
clude all provisions for expending federal money, so as to protect
officers acting under them. A strict construction requires the rul-
ing out of all persons except those clearly acting in their official
capacity to help in the vital activity of raising federal funds under
authorization of Congress. Regarding other officers named, a
deputy United States marshal has been called an officer of the
court, and entitled to the removal of a prosecution to the federal
court.15 4 This is likewise true of receivers appointed by a federal
court sued for the negligent operation of a train;"5r but the sec-
tion has been held not to apply to commissioners appointed by a
federal district court to act as examining magistrates for offenses
against federal law.'" While national liquor prohibition was in
effect, a prohibition officer could remove state prosecutions for
acts done in the performance of official acts,"' but not prosecu-
tions for acts plainly outside those duties and not under color of
authority, such as for perjury committed at a coroner's inquest
over the body of the person killed by him" 8 or for reckless driv-
ing while not on official duty.1 9
Suit against a revenue officer to recover a tax paid under pro-
test can be removed, 10 also a suit against a collector of customs
by an informer for the proceeds of goods condemned for breach
of revenue laws,'' a suit against a surveyor of customs for dam-
age done while acting officially, 162 and an action against a post-
150. Warner v. Fowler, 29 Fed. Cas. No. 17,182 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1859).
151. Peyton v. Bliss, 19 Fed. Cas. No. 11,055 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1868).
152. Twin Falls Canal Co. v. Foote, 192 Fed. 583 (C.C. Idaho 1911).
153. Underwood v. Dismukes, 266 Fed. 559 (D.C.R.I. 1920).
154. People of State of Illinois v. Moody, 9 F. (2d) 628 (S.D. Ill. 1925);
Carter v. State of Tennessee, 18 F. (2d) 850 (C.C.A. 6th, 1927).
155. American Locomotive Co. v. Histed, 18 F. (2d) 656 (W.D. Mo. 1926);
Newell v. Byram, 18 F. (2d) 657 (D.C. Minn. 1927).
156. Benchley v. Gilbert, 3 Fed. Cas. No. 1,291 (C.C.N.D. N.Y. 1871).
157. Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 46 S.Ct. 185, 70 L.Ed. 449 (1926); Ore-
gon v. Wood, 268 Fed. 975 (D.C. Ore. 1920). Before the Soper case, the Na-
tional Prohibition Act had been declared not a revenue act, so as to refuse
removal of a state prosecution of an officer acting under it.
158. Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 36, 46 S.Ct. 192, 70 L.Ed. 459 (1926).
159. State of Florida v. Huston, 283 Fed. 687 (S.D. Fla. 1922).
160. Venable v. Richards, 105 U.S. 636, 26 L.Ed. 1196 (1882).
161. Van Zandt v. Maxwell, 28 Fed. Cas. No. 16,884 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1852).
See also Barnette v. Wells Fargo Nevada Nat. Bk., 270 U.S. 438, 46 S.Ct. 326,
70 L.Ed. 669 (1926), where removal was allowed of a suit to recover land and
funds in charge of a court created by an act of Congress.
162. W. H. Thomas & Son Co. v. Barnett, 135 Fed. 172 (C.C.W.D. Ky. 1905),
affirmed 144 Fed. 338 (C.C.A. 6th, 1906).
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master for an allegedly wrongful refusal to deliver a letter.163 On
the other hand, removal was refused of a suit against a federal
commissioner to recover money illegally exacted by him as costs
and fees in a criminal prosecution under revenue laws,' a libel
action against officers, of the post office department for promulgat-
ing a fraud order against the plaintiff, 65 a prosecution of a deputy
marshal for a homicide committed while not acting officially dur-
ing a riot at the polls in an election, 166 a prosecution for violating
the state liquor law though defendant held a license from the fed-
eral government,' 7 and a suit by a chattel mortgagee against a
trustee in bankruptcy to fix a lien on the proceeds of fire insur-
ance policies on the mortgaged property.' 68
As for the procedure, the removal petition cannot be filed
until the case has commenced, which has been interpreted as
being when an indictment has been presented against the defend-
ant;1 6  but where an indictment is not required for the trial of an
offense, the prosecution may be deemed commenced before in-
dictment. 1'7 0 The petition must be filed "at any time before trial
or final hearing," and it has been treated as made in time even
after judgment when there was an appeal which vacated the
judgment under state law.'7 ' In the removal petition presented
to the federal district court the defendant must state the facts
establishing himself as one of the officers named in the section,
and that the act on which suit is brought was done under color of
his official capacity. The petition of revenue officers for the re-
moval of a state murder prosecution need allege only enough facts
to show the homicide was justified, or admit that one of them
committed it.' 2 Sufficient cause for removal was alleged where
the defendant said he was a federal revenue officer attempting to
seize an illegal distillery, when he was assaulted and had to kill
his assailant in self-defense.' 8 The particular cause of action does
163. Warner v. Fowler, 29 Fed. Cas. No. 17,182 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1859).
164. Benchley v. Gilbert, 3 Fed. Cas. No. 1,291 (C.C.N.D. N.Y. 1871).
165. People's U. S. Bank v. Goodwin, 162 Fed. 937 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1908).
166. Illinois v. Fletcher, 22 Fed. 776 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1884).
167. Commonwealth v. Casey, 94 Mass. 214 (1866).
168. Ford Motor Co. v. Automobile Ins. Co., 13 F. (2d) 415 (E.D. Mich.
1926).
169. Virginia v. Paul, 148 U.S. 107, 13 S.Ct. 536, 37 L.Ed. 386 (1893) (man-
damus can be secured from a higher court to force a remand to the state
court of the case improperly or prematurely removed).
170. Commonwealth of Virginia v. Bingham, 88 Fed. 561 (C.C.W.D. Va.
1898); Virginia v. Felts, 133 Fed. 85 (C.C.W.D. Va. 1904).
171. In re Duane, 261 Fed. 242 (D.C. Mass. 1919).
172. State of Maryland v. Ford, 12 F. (2d) 289 (D.C. Md. 1926).
173. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 25 L.Ed. 648 (1880).
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not have to be shown in the petition as long as it clearly appears
that the defendant is sued as a result of his official acts;174 but
verification of the petition by affidavit of an attorney must be
included in order to have a proper removal.'75
The facts alleged in the petition are considered by the federal
court which decides whether removal is due, and this is usually
done by ex parte hearing. 76 Although the jurisdiction of the state
court has been immediately divested on the filing of the petition,
a writ of certiorari directed to the state court is granted; the serv-
ing of such auxiliary process being merely the performance of a
ministerial duty.17 7
In the federal court the case proceeds as if commenced there,
though on the trial of an indictment removed under this provi-
sion, the state law is applied in defining the offense.178 The state
prosecuting officer directs the prosecution just as he would if
there had been no removal, and the United States attorney ordi-
narily represents the accused, 179 though it is not prejudicial to the
federal officer if he refuses to make the defense. 18 0 Where a case
has been improperly removed, the district court's refusal to re-
mand may be reviewed by the Supreme Court on application for
a writ of mandamus. 181
SUITS BY ALIENS AGAINST FEDERAL OFFICERS
A seldom used section of the Judicial Code (§ 34) provides
that when an alien brings a personal action against a civil officer
of the United States in the court of a state of which the latter is
a nonresident, the defendant may remove the suit to the district
court. 812 This section does not impliedly forbid removal of a suit
by an alien against a nonresident federal officer under the preced-
ing section, which is usually done.188
174. Abranches v. Schell, 1 Fed. Cas. No. 21 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1859).
175. Ford Motor Co. v. Automobile Ins. Co., 13 F. (2d) 415 (E.D. Mich.
1926).
176. Dennistoun v. Draper, 7 Fed. Cas. No. 3,804 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1866).
177. Davis v. South Carolina, 107 U.S. 597, 2 S.Ct. 636, 27 L.Ed. 574 (1883);
State v. Sullivan, 50 Fed. 593 (C.C.W.D. N.C. 1892).
178. Georgia v. O'Grady, 10 Fed. Cas. No. 5,852 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1876); North
Carolina v. Gosnell, 74 Fed. 734 (C.C.W.D. N.C. 1896).
179. Delaware v. Emerson, 8 Fed. 411 (C.C. Del. 1881).
180. Carter v. State of Tennessee, 18 F. (2d) 850 (C.C.A. 6th, 1927).
181. Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 46 S.Ct. 185, 70 L.Ed. 449 (1926).
182. Judicial Code, § 34, 28 U.S.C.A. § 77 (1926.)
183. Matarazzo v. Hustis, 256 Fed. 882 (N.D. N.Y. 1919).
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PREJUDICE OR LOCAL INFLUENCE
This ground of removal, first provided for by the Act of
March 2, 1867, owed its origin to the impression that state preju-
dices fanned by the Civil War would interfere with the regular
administration of law in the state courts.18 4 This supposition ex-
plains the requirement that one of the parties be a resident of
the state from whose courts the removal is sought and that the
removing party be a nonresident, which gives rise to the pre-
sumption of prejudice in favor of the resident.18 5 Section 28 of the
Judicial Code, sentence 4, reads as follows:
"And where a suit is brought in any State court, in which
there is a controversy between a citizen of the State in which
the suit is brought and a citizen of another State, any defend-
ant, being such a citizen of another State, may remove such
suit into the district court of the United States for the proper
district, at any time before the trial thereof, when it shall
be made to appear to said disrict court that from prejudice or
local influence he will not be able to obtain justice in such
State court or in any other State court to which the said de-
fendant may, under the laws of the State, have the right, on
account of such prejudice or local influence, to remove said
cause.
The third and fourth sentences of this removal section have
been called special cases under the first two sentences, whose re-
quirements must be met before removal is granted.18 6 On this
reasoning, the requisite of jurisdictional amount has been made
for removal on the ground of prejudice or local influence.'87 Like-
wise, it has been repeatedly held that removal for prejudice or
local influence can be made only when complete diversity of citi-
zenship exists as to all the parties.1 8 Personal citizenship of par-
184. Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10, 23 L.Ed. 524 (1876).
185. American Bible Soc. v. Grove, 101 U.S. 610, 25 L.Ed. 847 (1880).
186. In re Cilley, 58 Fed. 977 (C.C. N.H. 1893), where an action to probate
a will was declared not such a suit of a civil nature "at common law or
equity" as to permit its removal. But see Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10, 23
L.Ed. 524 (1876), where suit to annul the probate of a will was called a civil
suit and removable within the statute, since the power of Congress to make
cases removable was absolute within the terms of the Constitution.
187. In re Pennsylvania Co., 137 U.S. 451, 11 S.Ct. 141, 34 L.Ed. 738 (1890).
Accord: Carson & Rand Lumber Co. v. Holtzclaw, 39 Fed. 578 (C.C.E.D. Mo.
1889).
188. Young v. Parker, 132 U.S. 267, 10 S.Ct. 75, 33 L.Ed. 352 (1889); Han-
rick v. Hanrick, 153 U.S. 192, 14 S.Ct. 835, 38 L.Ed. 685 (1894); Cochran v.
Montgomery County, 199 U.S. 260, 26 S.Ct. 58, 50 L.Ed. 182 (1905). See also
Vannevar,v. Bryant, 88 U.S. 41, 22 L.Ed. 476 (1874); Jefferson v. Driver, 117
U.S. 272, 6 S.Ct. 729, 29 L.Ed. 897 (1886).
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ties acting in an official capacity is what governs in determining
diversity;8 9 but when the codefendants of a nonresident are not
necessary parties, and the case can be fully determined without
their presence, he can secure a removal. 190 It has been held that
because the statute says that removal could be had by "Any
defendant, being such citizen of another state," a nonresident
defendant would be allowed to remove for prejudice or local in-
fluence, despite the joinder with citizens of the same state as
plaintiff, and the absence of a separable controversy;' but the
Supreme Court has declared that while this construction might
seem to be indicated by these words when considered alone, still
the section as a whole showed an intention to require all the par-
ties on the one side to have different state citizenship from all the
parties on the other, before removal could be secured. 9 2 Diversity
can be based on the citizenship of an assignee of a chose in action,
for the "assignment provision" does not apply to removal for
prejudice or local influence, or removals generally, but only to
original federal jurisdiction. 93 Since the provision is expressly
extended only to citizens of a state and deals with a situation
peculiar to them, an alien cannot remove for prejudice or local
influence.0 4
Under the Act of 1867, the nonresident plaintiff could remove
on this ground, 19' but the Act of 1887-88 allowed only the de-
fendant to do so.9 6 A formal defendant cannot remove, 19 but a
nonresident plaintiff can secure removal of a counterclaim against
him, becoming a "defendant" as to it. 9 ' A corporation is within
the provision for removal for prejudice or local influence, the
189. Amory v. Amory, 95 U.S. 186, 24 L.Ed. 428 (1877).
190. Swann v. Myers, 79 N.C. 87 (1878).
191. Whelan v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 35 Fed. 849, 1 L.R.A. 65
(C.C.N.D. Ohio 1888).
192. Cochran v. Montgomery County, 199 U.S. 260, 26 S.Ct. 58, 50 L.Ed. 182
(1905).
193. Jackson & Sharp Co. v. Pearson, 60 Fed. 113 (C.C. Ky. 1892). See
also Lexington v. Butler, 81 U.S. 282, 20 L.Ed. 809 (1872); Hobby v. Allison,
13 Fed. 401 (C.C. Mich. 1882).
194. Burlington, Cedar Rapids & W. Ry. Co. v. Dunn, 122 U.S. 513, 7 S.Ct.
1262, 80 L.Ed. 1159 (1887); Crane v. Reeder, 28 Mich. 527, 15 Am. Rep. 223
(1874).
195. Johnson v. Monell, 13 Fed. Cas. No. 7,399 (C.C. Neb. 1869).
196. Tullock v. Webster County, 40 Fed. 706 (C.C. Neb. 1889).
197. Adelbert College v. Toledo, W. & W. Ry. Co., 47 Fed. 336 (C.C.N.D.
Ohio 1891), appeal dismissed 146 U.S. 355, 13 S.Ct. 186, 36 L.Ed. 1003 (1892).
198. Clarkson v. Manson, 4 Fed. 257 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1880); Walcott v. Wat-
son, 46 Fed. 529 (C.C. Nev. 1891).
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petition and affidavit to be made by the proper officer.19 The
mere fact of complying with a state's laws in order to do business
does not preclude it from being a nonresident; 20 0 but a corporation
originally created in the state of suit is not a nonresident by
reason of holding franchises in two other states. 2 1
Time of Application for Removal
Under the Act of 1867, removal for prejudice or local influ-
ence could be asked "at any time before the final hearing or trial
of the suit. 20 2 The Act of 1875 did not deal with prejudice or
local influence at all, but allowed removal for diverse citizenship
"before or at the term at which said cause could be first tried and
before the trial thereof." An important change was made in the
Act of 1887-88, where the petition of removal for. prejudice or
local influence must be filed "at any time before the trial," the
dropping of the word "final" serving as a material restriction of
the right to remove for this cause. In Fisk v. Henarie20 3 applica-
tion to remove was made after earlier trials had ended in mistrial,
and the majority said that this change in the statute was intended
to allow removal before only the first trial of the case, under the
policy of restriction found in the 1887-88 Act; a dissenting opinion
was based on the idea that removal could be had when asked for
before any trial de novo after the prejudice first became evident,
even though there had been earlier mistrials. The decision that
application must be made before the first trial would not how-
ever be extended to require petition before or at the first term at
which the case could be tried, as provided in the Act of 1875 for
diverse citizenship; an application was not too late when made
before the first trial on the merits had fairly begun, although the
case could have come up long before then.20 4
The question then arises as to when a trial on the merits is
yet to be had. After a claim against a county had been passed
199. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Maquillan, 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4,668 (C.C.
Kan. 1874); Quigley v. Central Pac. R. Co., 11 Nev. 350, 21 Am. Rep. 757
(1876).
200. Southern Ry. Co. v. Allison, 190 U.S. 326, 23 S.Ct. 713, 47 L.Ed.
1078 (1903), reversing 129 N.C. 336, 40 S.E. 91 (1901).
201. Bradley v. Ohio R. & C. Ry. Co., 78 Fed. 387 (C.C.W.D. N.C. 1896).
202. For time of application under the Act of 1867, see Vannevar v. Bry-
ant, 88 U.S. 41, 22 L.Ed. 476 (1874); Stevenson v. Williams, 86 U.S. 572, 22 L.Ed.
162 (1874); Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Bates, 119 U.S. 464, 7 S.Ct. 285, 30 L.Ed.
436 (1886).
203. 142 U.S. 459, 12 S.Ct. 207, 35 L.Ed. 1080 (1892).
204. Detroit v. Detroit City Ry. Co., 54 Fed. 1 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1893). Ac-
cord: Fisk v. Henarle, 142 U.S. 459, 12 S.Ct. 207, 35 L.Ed. 1080 (1892); Parker
v. Vanderbilt, 136 Fed. 246 (C.C.W.D. N.C. 1905).
1939]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
upon by the board of commissioners and before the trial de novo
by a jury on appeal to the circuit court of the county, an appli-
cation for removal was held to be brought in time.205 Likewise
an application was granted where there was an appeal from dis-
allowance by probate commissioners of a claim to an estate, when
a new trial on the merits before a jury could be secured in the
circuit court of the state to which appeal was pending.206 Refer-
ence of the case to a master to take evidence and reach a decision
was held to be a trial, so as to render a subsequent attempt at
removal too late.2 0 7 The same was true of a hearing on a de-
fault,2 0 8 and a motion to discharge an arrest acted as an appear-
ance for the defendant, to defeat his right of removal;2 0 9 but a
hearing before an arbitration board was not a trial within the
meaning of the statute and did not prevent later application.211
Ex parte orders of an interlocutory nature do not constitute trials
preventing later removal.211 Thus the appointment of a tempo-
rary receiver is not a trial.212
The trial must be commenced in earnest to bar removal;
merely preparing for trial by selection of a jury is not enough. 218
On the other hand, the Supreme Court repeats time and again
that a defendant cannot remove after the time named in the
statute; he cannot experiment in the state court and then remove
to the federal court when beaten.214 If application for removal is
made after commencement of the trial, the opposing party's fail-
ure to make a timely objection constitutes a waiver since this is
not a jurisdictional matter.215
Any plea that has the effect of passing on the merits of the
case serves to bar a subsequent application for removal for prej-
udice or local influence. Removal cannot be requested in the
event a plea in abatement is overruled, as under that motion one
205. Delaware County Commissioners v. Diebold Safe & Lock Co., 133
U.S. 473, 10 S.Ct. 399, 33 L.Ed. 674 (1890).
206. Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U.S. 73, 5 S.Ct. 377, 28 L.Ed. 927 (1885).
207. Neale v. Foster, 31 Fed. 53 (C.C. Ore. 1887).
208. McCallon v. Waterman, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8,675 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1877).
209. Dart v. Arnis, 19 How. Prac. 429 (N.Y. 1860).
210. Thorne v. Towanda Tanning Co., 15 Fed. 289 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1882).
211. McHenry v. New York, P. & 0. R. Co., 25 Fed. 65 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1885).
212. Franklin v. Wolf, 78 Ga. 446, 3 S.E. 696 (1887).
213. Yulee v. Vose, 99 U.S. 539, 25 L.Ed. 355 (1879); Removal Cases, 100
U.S. 457, 25 L.Ed. 593 (1879). See also Durkee v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 81 Fed.
1 (C.C.N.D. Iowa 1897) (the filing of an answer was not a trial under the
statute).
214. Rosenthal v. Coates, 148 U.S. 142, 13 S.Ct. 576, 37 L.Ed. 399 (1893).
215. French v. Hay, 89 U.S. 238, 22 L.Ed. 854 (1875); Knight v. Interna-
tionul & G. N. Ry. Co., 61 Fed. 87 (C.C.A. 5th, 1894).
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party looks to the state court to surrender its jurisdiction, and the
other asks it to hold the case to determine that plea.218 Most im-
portant of all, a hearing and passing on a demurrer prevents any
later attempt to remove as its effect is to deny that a cause of
action is stated, and this involves an examination into the merits
and not merely passing on a matter of form.217 Even when the
motion passed on by the state court does not involve the merits,
the federal court takes up the case on removal where the state
court left off, and will not hear the same point again.2 18
When the petition of removal for prejudice or local influence
is dismissed, the effect is the same as an order of remand, and is
not such a final judgment from which an appeal will lie.21 9
Necessary Showing of Prejudice, and How Made
When making application in the federal court for removal
based on prejudice or local influence, the statute does not require
notice to the other party. However, the better practice is for the
defendant to give notice to the plaintiff so as to afford him an
opportunity to present counter-affidavits at the hearing which
determines the truth and sufficiency of the defendant's affidavit.2 2 1
Further, bond is not expressly required by the statute, but the
bond given for removal on other grounds is usually demanded, and
it has been held that removal was correctly denied because of an
improper bond.2 2'
Under the Act of 1867, the defendant could merely state in
his petition of removal that he feared the court would not give
him justice, without giving the reasons for that belief. 2 2 In the
Act of 1887-88, however, appear the words, " . . . when it shall
be made to appear to said circuit court that from prejudice ......
There is some difference of opinion as to the effect of this provi-
sion. In Franz v. Wahl,223 it was said that a direct and unequiv-
216. Amy v. Manning, 144 Mass. 153, 10 N.E. 737 (1887), affirmed 140
U.S. 137, 11 S.Ct. 707, 35 L.Ed. 386 (1891).
217. Alley v. Nott, 111 U.S. 472, 4 S.Ct. 495, 28 L.Ed. 491 (1884); Scharff v.
Levy, 112 U.S. 711, 5 S.Ct. 360, 28 L.Ed. 825 (1884); Laidly v. Huntington, 121
U.S. 179, 7 S.Ct. 855, 30 L.Ed. 883 (1887).
218. Duncan v. Gegan, 101 U.S. 810, 25 L.Ed. 875 (1880).
219. Patten v. Cilley, 62 Fed. 497 (C.C. N.H. 1894).
220. Bonner v. Meikle, 77 Fed. 485 (C.C. Nev. 1896):
221. New Orleans, Ft. J. & G. I. R. Co. v. Rabasse, 44 La. Ann. 178, 10 So.
708 (1892).
222. Sutherland v. Jersey City & B. R. Co., 22 Fed. 356 (C.C. N.J. 1884);
Thatcher v. Rankin, 2 How. Prac. (N.S.) 459 (N.Y. 1885).
223. 81 Fed. 9 (E.D. Ark. 1897). The reasoning was similar to that in Short
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 33 Fed. 114 (C.C. Minn. 1887), with the difference,
however, that this earlier case was under the 1867 Act which did not require
a showing of prejudice.
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ocal declaration of prejudice or local influence was enough to
secure removal, and a statement of the facts on which the re-
quest was based was not here required as long as the affidavit did
not state merely a belief. The other view was that the new re-
quirement of a showing of prejudice made it necessary for the
defendant to state facts establishing it, and this came to be recog-
nized as settled with Ex parte Pennsylvania.2 24 How the preju-
dice or local influence shall be made to appear is left to the dis-
cretion of the federal court to which application is made, but the
recognized guide to this discretion requires a statement of enough
facts to establish legally and not merely morally that prejudice
exists, and a mere flat statement that it does exist is held insuffi-
cient.22 5
The necessary showing of prejudice is made when the remov-
ing party alleges facts establishing either that there is a strong
feeling in the state against himself, or that it is in favor of the
opposing party.22 6 After the case has been removed, the federal
court on motion of remand could hear affidavits traversing allega-
tions of the removal petition, but the removability of the case
need not be shown when granting a change of venue discretionary
with the court. 2 7 There was a sufficient showing of prejudice
when the petition and the affidavits of several disinterested wit-
nesses stated that a bitterly-contested litigation between the
defendant and the city over possession of a road had sometime
before almost ended in a riot, and that the defendant could not
secure justice because of the local feeling even though other affi-
davits said justice could be obtained.2 8 The same was true where
a general feeling in the community existed that the defendant
bonding company ought not defend on a default by the county
treasurer. 9 The right of appeal to a court not affected by the
prejudice does not prevent removal, since the defendant is entitled
to an original trial before a court not subjected to the influence of
popular passions. 230 On the other hand, the "justice" to which the
224. 137 U.S. 451, 11 S.Ct. 141, 34 L.Ed. 738 (1890); Amy v. Manning, 38
Fed. 536 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1889); P. Schwenck & Co. v. Strang, 59 Fed. 209
(C.C.A. 8th, 1893).
225. Crotts v. Southern Ry. Co., 90 Fed. 1 (C.C.W.D. N.C. 1898).
226. Neale v. Foster, 31 Fed. 53 (C.C. Ore. 1887).
227. Smith v. Crosby Lbr. Co., 46 Fed. 819 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1891).
228. Herndon v. Southern R. Co., 76 Fed. 398 (C.C.E.D. N.C. 1896).
229. Montgomery County v. Cochran, 116 Fed. 985 (C.C.M.D. Ala. 1902),
reversed on other grounds 199 U.S. 260, 26 S.Ct. 58, 50 L.Ed. 182, 4 Ann. Cas.
451 (1905).
230. Detroit v. Detroit City Ry. Co., 54 Fed. 1 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1893).
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defendant is entitled is not necessarily a decree in his favor, nor
any other special result; 2 1 and the mere fact that the highest state
court declared that certain bonds constitute a lien on railroad
property when the Supreme Court said they did not, was not
such local prejudice as to justify removal but only a difference of
opinion. 82
After prejudice has been shown by such facts as the outbreak
of riots against defendant, refusal of local police to protect defend-
ant's property or employees, and so forth, the right of removal is
not lost simply because there will be no jury trial, since an elec-
tive judge is likely to be influenced by popular feeling in the same
way as jurors.283 However, the mere fact that a judge will have
to run for re-election is not of itself enough to allow removal
which is intended only to remedy cases of strong outward feeling;
it was not meant to apply to situations where the court may have
the ulterior motive of seeking popularity by means of a decision.23 4
When the state law permits change of venue to another court
where there is no existing prejudice, an affidavit indicating its
existence in a single county is not sufficient.2 3 5 But when a change
of venue was discretionary with the state court, removal could be
secured without showing the existence of prejudice in the other
counties.238
When the federal court has made a finding of prejudice or
local influence, that does not of itself cause the case to be removed
but only authorizes it. The petitioning defendant must then file
the order of removal in the state court which is thereby divested
of further authority over the case.287 There being no removal by
a plaintiff at present, the reference in the sixth sentence of sec-
tion 28 of the Judicial Code regarding the remand of cases re-
moved by "any party plaintiff" was at first considered a temporary
provision applying to cases then removed.3 8 But when it was
repeated in the Judiciary Act of 1911, that theory was dropped
231. Golightly v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 295 Fed 153 (N.D.
Tex. 1924).
232. Adelbert College v. Toledo, W. & W. Ry. Co., 47 Fed. 836 (C.C.N.D.
Ohio 1891), appeal dismissed 146 U.S. 355, 13 S.Ct. 186, 36 L.Ed. 1003 (1892).
233. Detroit v. Detroit City Ry. Co., 54 Fed. 1 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1893).
234. Turnbull Wagon Co. v. Linthicum Carriage Co., 80 Fed. 4 (C.C.N.D.
Ohio 1897).
235. Robison v. Hardy, 38 Fed. 49 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1889).
236. Parker v. Vanderbilt, 136 Fed. 246 (C.C.W.D. N.C. 1905).
237. Pennsylvania Co. v. Bender, 148 U.S. 255, 13 S.Ct. 591, 37 L.Ed. 441
1893).
238. Campbell v. Collins, 62 Fed. 849 (C.C.R.I. 1894).
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and it was considered as intended to read "defendant," and the
remand of cases removed for prejudice or local influence has been
made under this section rather than under section 37.
On the motion to remand, the court can hear evidence on the
question of whether such prejudice exists;22 9 but after removal
has once been granted, the burden of proving lack of prejudice is
on the plaintiff asking for an order of remand.2 40 If such an order
of remand is granted, however, the text of the statute expressly
provides that no review of the order can be made by appeal or
writ of error, indicating such a desire to end the controversy that
review by writ of mandamus was likewise refused. 241
SEPARABLE CONTROVERSY
Little trouble is offered by the general proposition that a non-
resident is allowed to remove when the plaintiff has joined de-
fendants in what to all intents and purposes are separate causes
of action. The difficulty comes in determining whether the con-
troversies are actually separable, or so interrelated that the de-
fendant of one must be present in order that full justice be done
in the other. Provision for removal on this ground is found in
Judicial Code, section 28, sentence 3, as follows:
"And when in any suit mentioned in this section there shall
be a controversy which is wholly between citizens of differ-
ent States, and which can be fully determined as between
them, then either one or more of the defendants actually in-
terested in such controversy may remove said suit into the
district court of the United States for the proper district."
Some of the general rules affecting separability may be men-
tioned, before suggesting a test for determining whether one con-
troversy is separable from another in the same case.
The controversy which is contended to be severable must be
between citizens of different states, and it does not matter that
the other controversy is between citizens of the same state.2 2
Once it is decided that there is a separable controversy between
citizens of different states, removal should be granted. Under the
later decisions seeking to avoid excessive litigation, the other con-
239. Carson & Rand Lumber Co. v. Holtzclaw, 39 Fed. 578 (C.C.E.D. Mo.
1889); Crotts v. Southern Ry. Co., 90 Fed. 1 (C.C.W.D. N.C. 1898).
240. Parker v. Vanderbilt, 136 Fed. 246 (C.C.W.D. N.C. 1905).
241. In re Pennsylvania Co., 137 U.S. 451, 11 S.Ct. 141, 34 L.Ed. 738
(1890).
242. Removal Cases, 100 U.S. 457, 25 L.Ed. 593 (1879).
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troversy is also taken along to the federal court,24 although an
early leading case permitting removal of the controversy between
citizens of different states left the other controversy in the state
court.244 It is necessary, therefore, not only to show separable con-
troversies, but likewise that one of them exists between parties
having complete diversity of citizenship.2 45 Furthermore, it is
necessary that each party be a citizen of some state,246 and that
the defendant making removal be a nonresident of the state where
the suit is pending.247
In determining the presence of a separable controversy, state
law governs the question of whether a joint cause of action is
stated against the codefendants, such as whether car inspectors
alleged to have committed the nonfeasance of duty in a failure to
inspect cars could be held jointly with the company.248
A separable controversy, within the meaning of the statute,
is a separate cause of action and not simply a separate remedy
against several persons on the same cause of action.249 The test is
met where a separate action could have been brought on this con-
troversy alone and still give the very relief sought by the petition
against the defendant or defendants removing, without the pres-
ence of the other parties in the suit being necessary. 210 In deter-
mining what controversies or what potential controversies are
involved, the plaintiff's petition is the guide, since the removal
must be made before issue is joined by the defendant. Thus the
status of a case, as separable or not, is determined by the plain-
tiff's bill.25 1 The fact that the lower federal court later renders a
decree in favor of the removing defendant does not prevent
remand by the Supreme Court of a case improperly removed.2 52
Jurisdiction is not based on whether the plaintiff can sustain his
243. City of Gainesville v. Brown-Crummer Inv. Co., 277 U.S. 54, 48 S.Ct.
454, 72 L.Ed. 781 (1928).
244. Barney v. Latham, 103 U.S. 205, 26 L.Ed. 514 (1880).
245. Sloane v. Anderson, 117 U.S. 275, 6 S.Ct. 730, 29 L.Ed. 899 (1886); Ala-
bama Great So. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 200 U.S. 206, 26 S.Ct. 161, 50 L.Ed. 441,
4 Ann. Cas. 1147 (1906); Scoutt v. Keck, 73 Fed. 900 (C.C.A. 8th, 1896).
246. Laden v. Meck, 130 Fed. 877 (C.C.A. 6th, 1904).
247. Thurber v. Miller, 67 Fed. 371 (C.C.A. 8th, 1895).
248. Morris v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 175 Fed. 491 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1910);
Beckwith v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 223 Fed. 858 (W.D. Wash. 1915);
Kelly v. Robinson, 262 Fed. 695 (E.D. Mo. 1920).
249. Gudger v. Western N. C. R. Co., 21 Fed. 81 (C.C.W.D. N.C. 1884).
250. Hilton v. Dickinson, 108 U.S. 165, 2 S.Ct. 424, 27 L.Ed. 688 (1883).
251. Graves v. Corbin, 132 U.S. 571, 10 S.Ct. 196, 83 L.Ed. 462 (1890).
252. Crump v. Thurber, 115 U.S. 56, 5 S.Ct. 1154, 29 L.Ed. 328 (1885).
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allegations, which is a matter of the merits, but on what he has in
good faith alleged in his petition. 5'
Since there must exist a distinct cause of action that could
have been brought as an independent suit,214 it must be fully
capable of determination between the parties to it, without the
presence of any others being required for the rendering of full
justice.255 If any demand fixing the rights of one defendant also
affects the rights of another defendant in the other controversy,
there is no separability. 26 The fact of suing less than all of sev-
eral tort-feasors does not act as an election to make the action
severable as to each of those sued;2 7 neither is this the result of
a failure to serve the resident defendant in a joint suit,2 8 or of a
disclaimer by one defendant of any interest in the suit.2 59 Sep-
arability is not created by a dismissal of the action as to the resi-
dent defendant against the plaintiff's will,260 nor by an involuntary
nonsuit concerning such resident.2 1
A merely incidental or collateral claim against one defend-
ant does not make a separable controversy as to him,26 2 such as a
judgment creditor's joinder of those holding prior incumbrances
on his debtor's property which he intends to seize;2 6 but an insur-
ance company's presence in a suit by reason of subrogation is not
collateral to the main suit for negligently causing a fire, and the
nonresident insurance company could remove for separable con-
troversy.24 A request for the reformation of a mortgage, where
the main demand was for its foreclosure, was considered so inci-
253. Dougherty v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 122 Fed. 205 (C.C.A. 5th, 1903).
254. Yulee v. Vose, 99 U.S. 539, 25 L.Ed. 355 (1879); Fraser v. Jennison,
106 U.S. 191, 1 S.Ct. 171, 27 L.Ed. 131 (1882).
255. Hyde v. Ruble, 104 U.S. 407, 26 L.Ed. 823 (1882); Corbin v. Van Brunt,
105 U.S. 576, 26 L.Ed. 1176 (1882).
256. Marsh v. Atlanta & F. R. Co., 53 Fed 168 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1892).
257. Fox v. Mackay, 60 Fed. 4 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1894).
258. Patchin v. Hunter, 38 Fed. 51 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1889); Armstrong v.
Kansas City So. Ry. Co., 192 Fed. 608 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1911).
259. Hax v. Casper, 31 Fed. 499 (C.C. Colo. 1887).
260. Lathrop, Shea & Henwood Co. v. Interior Constr. & Imp. Co., 215 U.S.
246, 30 S.Ct. 76, 54 L.Ed. 177 (1909).
261. American Car & Foundry Co. v. Kettelhake, 236 U.S. 311, 35 S.Ct. 355,
59 L.Ed. 594 (1915); Southern Ry. Co. v. Lloyd, 239 U.S. 496, 36 S.Ct. 210, 60
L.Ed. 402 (1916). See also Putnam v. Ingraham, 114 U.S. 57, 5 S.Ct. 746, 29
L.Ed. 65 (1885) (default of the resident codefendant does not cause sep-
arability as to the nonresident).
262. Security Co. v. Pratt, 64 Fed. 405 (C.C. Conn. 1894).
263. Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Huntington, 117 U.S. 280, 6 S.Ct. 733, 29 L.Ed. 898
(1886).
264. Ireton v. Pennsylvania Co., 185 Fed. 84 (C.C.A. 6th, 1911), cert. denied
223 U.S. 728, 32 S.Ct. 526, 56 L.Ed. 633 (1912).
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dental as to be nonseparable. 26 5 Where all other issues depended
on whether a partnership relation existed between the defend-
ants, there was no separability as to any of them. 16 This was also
true of an incidental party joined in an ejectment action against
the occupant of the premises, because of privity in estate with
such occupant. 2 7 It is different where the liability claimed against
the second defendant is upon a ground different from that alleged
against the first. Thus in a suit against an insolvent corporation,
with a claim that the second defendant had assumed all of the
corporate debts, the claims were separable.268
A Suggested Test for Determining Separability
If the separable controversy is to be something less than the
whole suit but capable of becoming an independent suit, it must
contain a cause of action independent of the other controversy.
One way to determine whether there is such a cause of action
is to see if two rules of law are needed to dispose of the whole
suit. 26 If only one rule of law is sufficient, there is no separable
controversy, even though there may be several phases of the case
and distinct remedies for and against different parties plaintiff or
defendant. If one phase of the case cannot be disposed of by
applying the rule needed for the other, it means that the actions
are not joint, though if the defendant makes no motion for the
separation that is available they might be joined for convenience.
For example, plaintiff's suit against a bank to recover stock
placed in escrow, and against an individual for a sum of money
claimed to be due under a contract, presented matters governed
by different rules of law and the nonresident could remove his
separable controversy.270 Similarly, a suit to establish as fraudu-
lent a transfer of ships and barges did not deal with the same
questions of law and fact as an attempt to have an entirely sep-
arate conveyance of lots and real estate declared fraudulent. The
265. Winchell v. Coney, 27 Fed. 482 (C.C. Conn. 1886).
266. Shainwald v. Lewis, 108 U.S. 158, 2 S.Ct. 385, 27 L.Ed. 691 (1883).
267. Crane v. Seitz, 30 Mich. 453 (1874).
268. Mecke v. Valleytown Min. Co., 93 Fed. 697 (C.C.A. 4th, 1899).
269. This test was suggested by the following words in In re Foley, 80
Fed. 949, 952-953 (C.C. Nev. 1897): "All persons claiming any right to share in
the distribution of the property are equally interested in the proceedings.
Their rights must be measured and determined by the same rule. It cannot
be held that the nonresidents would be entitled to have that question, as to
them, determined in the federal court, while other claimants, who are resi-
dents of the states, would be compelled to try the same issue, as between
themselves, in the probate court of the state."
270. Old Dominion Oil Co. v. Superior Oil Corp., 283 Fed. 636 (W.D. Ky.
1922).
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latter cause of action presented a separable controversy, wherein
justice could be done without the presence of the parties to the
other transaction. 271 Where the question of title to certain land
was governed by a different rule of law than the continued valid-
ity of certain notes, even though the points were interrelated,
it was held that there was a separable controversy allowing
removal.27 2
On the other hand, the same rule of negligence governs the
question of whether a railroad and its employee will be held for
an injury caused by the act of the employee, and there is no sep-
arable controversy as to one of them. 273 The same result has been
reached where a suit under a single contract involved all of the
defendants in the same questions of law and fact, and all must
be present to do full justice in the case.274 An action of specific
performance against two persons to enforce a single agreement
was not separable, the same rule of law governing the liability
of both defendants. 275 In an action against several defendants for
wrongful seizure of plaintiff's property, the filing of separate an-
swers does not make the action removable for separable contro-
versy, as the same rule of liability would apply to each.
276
An action to force trustees to comply with an agreement did
not require the presence of the lessee of the property to have full
justice done, and since different questions of law and fact arise
as to him, the nonresident lessee can remove for separable con-
troversy.277 Again, the legal action to try title involves a different
principle of law and a different view of the facts from the equi-
table action of accounting and partition, and removal can be ob-
tained on the ground of a separable controversy, for though both
are properly part of the same suit something less than the whole
suit is meant by the term controversy.278 However, the fact that
on foreclosure of a mortgage another creditor entered the sep-
arate defense that his mortgage was superior to the plaintiff's did
not inject a separable controversy into the suit, which was gov-
271. Sheldon v. Keokuk N. L. P. Co., 1 Fed. 789 (C.C.W.D. Wis. 1880).
272. Snow v. Smith, 88 Fed. 657 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1882).
273. Alabama Great So. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 200 U.S. 206, 26 S.Ct. 161,
50 L.Ed. 441, 4 Ann. Cas. 1147 (1906); Beckwith v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry.
Co., 223 Fed. 858 (W.D. Wash. 1915); Baker v. Jacksonville Traction Co., 247
Fed. 718 (S.D. Fla. 1917).
274. Hyde v. Ruble, 104 U.S. 407, 26 L.Ed. 823 (1882).
275. Scoutt v. Keck, 73 Fed. 900 (C.C.A. 8th, 1896).
276. Sloane v. Anderson, 117 U.S. 275, 6 S.Ct. 730, 28 L.Ed. 899 (1886).
277. Stevens v. Richardson, 9 Fed. 191 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1881).
278. Harrison v. Harrison, 5 F. (2d) 1001 (N.D. Miss. 1922).
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erned by the single rule of law determining whether foreclosure
should be allowed against the mortgagor and all his other cred-
itors.2 10
In examining how the proposed test works when applied to
decided cases, it is noted that where one defendant would be held,
if at all, on a different legal theory of liability from the other,
removal has been allowed;2 80 while the existence of a joint claim
against both, with the same principle of law holding each, con-
stitutes a nonseparable controversy with a consequent denial of
removal.281
CONCLUSION
When the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have become
more familiar to the legal profession, it is quite likely that resort
will often be made to the federal courts in order to secure reme-
dies not now available in the state courts. Should the defendant
be the party desiring such a remedy, removal must be made, and
after it has been accomplished, the federal court proceeds with
the case from the point reached in the state court, regardless of
whether final pleadings have yet been made.28 2 In making the
transfer and opening the avenue for obtaining these new reme-
dies available in the federal courts, the rules governing removal
have not been affected, and it is to this matter of removal juris-
diction that the present article has been directed.
279. Thurber v. Miller, 67 Fed. 371 (C.C.A. 8th, 1895).
280. Sharp v. Whiteside, 19 Fed. 150 (C.C.E.D. Tenn. 1883); County Court
v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 35 Fed. 161 (C.C. W.Va. 1888); McIntyre v. Southern
Ry. Co., 131 Fed. 985 (C.C.S.C. 1904); Stimson v. United Wrapping Mach. Co.,
156 Fed. 298 (C.C.W.D. N.Y. 1907); Bainbridge Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co., 182 Fed. 276 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1910); Murray v. Southern Bell T. & T.
Co., 210 Fed. 925 (E.D.S.C. 1914); Floyd v. Ford Motor Co., 13 F. Supp. 980
(S.D. Fla. 1936).
281. Pirie v. Tvedt, 115 U.S. 41, 5 S.Ct. 1034, 29 L.Ed. 331 (1885); Davis v.
County Court of Randolph County, 88 Fed. 705 (C.C. W.Va. 1898); Roberts v.
Shelby Steel Tube Co., 131 Fed. 729 (C.C.A. 6th, 1904); Helena Power Trans-
mission Co. v. Spratt, 146 Fed. 310 (C.C. Mont. 1906).
282. Rule 81(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Part I, n.1, supra
p. 499.
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